with other theories-but these are implications of a conjunction of theories, not of any single theory. Taken by itself, a moral theory may also have methodological rather than substantive implications; it may suggest how we should conduct future moral inquiries rather than what we must conclude. More generally, a theory may be a conversation starter rather than a conversation stopper, suggesting what new questions we should investigate, what new possibilities we should consider, without establishing any new and important conclusions which we must believe. Moral sentimentalism (or just "sentimentalism," as I will call it) is important in all of these ways. This essay will focus on what Jesse Prinz and many others have taken to be the most important substantive moral implication of sentimentalism. Sentimentalism is thought to imply moral relativism.
2 Prinz defends this common view by arguing that, once the truth of sentimentalism is established, we must face the fact that "there may be moral conflicts that have no rational resolution" (p. XX). I think that Prinz is right here; no one can consistently affirm sentimentalism while denying that there may be moral conflicts that have no rational resolution.
But I don't think that anything much further follows from this implication-certainly nothing of particular importance for normative ethics, politics or law, and most certainly not moral relativism. After all, even if our moral conflicts are not capable of rational resolution, they may nonetheless be resolvable through non-rational means. It is my hope that they can be resolved in this way-and my conviction that they should be-that leads me to oppose relativism as both a philosophical theory and as a practical approach to ethics and politics. Yet both Prinz and I are sentimentalists, and our conceptions of what sentimentalism involves are essentially the same.
So how is it possible for two consistent defenders of sentimentalism to differ on so much else? It might be thought that some of the room for disagreement comes from the ambiguity of sentimentalism itself. While this is not the primary source of the dispute at hand, I do think that there are some ambiguities in the formulation of sentimentalism which need to be addressed.
I accept Prinz's "constitution model" of sentimentalism, which maintains that moral judgments contain emotions, rather than simply being judgments about emotions as under many so-called neo-(or, really, quasi-)sentimentalist theories today. 3 But even once one accepts the constitution model, important ambiguities remain. The claim that moral judgments contain emotions can be understood as an empirical generalization, a conceptual necessity, or a normative precept. I actually think sentimentalism is probably true in all three of these ways. But philosophers can feel free to embrace one or two while rejecting the other(s).
First, consider descriptive, empirical sentimentalism: the claim that, as a matter of psychological fact, most of our moral judgments can be observed to contain emotions most of the time. Prinz makes a strong case that this empirical generalization is well-supported by recent research in experimental psychology and neuroscience. Yet this descriptive theory, while undoubtedly preferable to its rivals, is nothing new. To the contrary, it has been widely accepted throughout the Western philosophical tradition. Indeed, it has been accepted even by most philosophers classified as moral rationalists. And any theory embraced by Plato, the Stoics, One would be hard-pressed to find a major, canonical moral rationalist who denied that emotions are a component of most of our moral judgments most of the time. Plato would hardly be surprised to see that most experimental subjects are governed by passion rather than reason.
Most subjects in experimental psychology are undergraduates, after all, and there is nothing more sophomoric than being governed by one's passions. Yet even if empirical sentimentalism is also true for most of us above the legal drinking age, what allowed Plato to be a rationalist is that he thought that the way most people make most moral judgments most of the time is irrelevant to moral philosophy. He embraced what Prinz, following today's current psychological practice, calls a dual process model. There are two ways moral judgments can be formed, one of which includes emotion and one which does not. The former results in moral opinion, while the latter results in moral knowledge. Knowledge is incomparably superior to opinion, and wields an authority which opinion lacks. 4 The goal of philosophy is thus to allow us to form judgments on the basis of reason alone. Since only a tiny minority, beneficiaries of either very rare divine gifts or a very particular education (most decidedly not the kind of education available to today's undergraduates), could ever hope to achieve moral knowledge, only they will form moral judgments which do not contain emotion. 5 For those concerned with empirical generalizations, these philosopher-kings (if any exist at any given time) would be mere outliers. Plato's is not the kind of dual-process model subject to empirical falsification. 4 For two of the many Platonic discussions of the superiority of moral knowledge to moral opinion, see Meno 97a-100b (In Plato, Complete Works, Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997, pp. 895-897) and Republic 477-480 (pp. 1103-1107) . 5 For the claim that only a minority will achieve moral knowledge or understanding, see, among many other passages in the Platonic corpus, Timaeus 51e (Cooper, ed., p. 1254). The educational plan designed to produce moral knowledge takes up much of the Republic; see especially 376-417 (pp. 1015-1052) and 503-541 (pp. 1123-1155) .
That said, empirical sentimentalism does imply an empirical version of the claim that not all moral conflicts are capable of rational resolution. As long as the mass of humanity remains stuck in the mire of conflicting passions, and hence conflicting moral opinions, any disagreement with or among them will not be rationally resolvable. In Plato's view, our only hope is that those who are incapable of moral knowledge may come to possess true moral opinions through nonrational means. The rational few must therefore manipulate the passionate many to comply with reason's demands, and must do so through some combination of coercion and deception. This is the ultimate ground of the philosophical elite's right to absolute rule over the non-philosophical masses.
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Of course, one need not be an elitist or anti-egalitarian in order to accept sentimentalism as an empirical generalization while nonetheless remaining a rationalist along roughly Platonic lines. Kant, too, had a dual-process model, one which was just as scientifically untestable as Plato's. Here, the distinction between opinion and knowledge is replaced by a distinction between heteronomous and autonomous moral judgment. While heteronomous judgment is the result of empirically observable causal forces-with what Kant called "Neigung" ("inclination")
foremost among them-autonomous judgment is the self-legislation of pure, noumenal reason.
All rational agents as such are capable of this self-legislation, but even on introspection they can never be sure that they have achieved it. Although an action may clearly be in conformity with duty, we can never be entirely certain it was done from duty, and hence possessed genuine moral 6 See, among other defenses of this claim in the Republic, 484b-484d (Cooper, ed., pp. 1107 (Cooper, ed., pp. -1108 could be conducted to rule out the sort of purely rational moral judgment that Plato and Kant describe. Most twentieth-century anti-rationalists therefore sought to rule out this possibility on conceptual grounds. The claim that moral judgment contains emotion is, they claimed, implicit in the very idea of morality itself, and can be established using the armchair techniques of conceptual analysis. 9 I think they were probably right, but, the literature on the matter has grown so baroque over the past century, and my skills as an analytic philosopher are so limited, that I remain unsure.
Fortunately, the separate path of normative sentimentalism is also available. If conceptual sentimentalism were true, then one of its implications would be normative sentimentalism. Since ought implies can, if purely rational moral judgments are a contradiction in terms, then it cannot be our duty to pursue them. But normative sentimentalism can also be established independently of its conceptual cousin. Even if purely rational moral judgments were possible, there is no reason to believe that they would be superior to judgments containing emotions. Or, more modestly, even if they might be possible for some sort of conceivable rational being, they are not the sort of judgments we should ever attempt. Adam Smith suggests as much when he notes that the kinds of moral judgments which might be appropriate for God to make are not appropriate for creatures such as ourselves. 10 Given the independence of normative from conceptual sentimentalism, twentieth-century analytic metaethicists did sentimentalism a real disservice by focusing almost exclusively on moral concepts and moral language. 9 For the classic statements of metaethical sentimentalism in its "emotivist" variant see Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936 Slote recounts, Hume has been read as a subjectivist descriptivist ("x is right" means "I approve of x"), an expressivist emotivist, ("Hurray for x!"), an ideal observer theorist ("a precisely specified perfect spectator would approve of x"), a projectivist error theorist (our approval of x lead us to assert falsely that it has a property of goodness which it does not actually possess) and, in Slote's innovation, possibly even a proto-Kripkean reference-fixing theorist (a position too complicated to explain here). Although all these metaethical theories can be categorized as sentimentalist, they are all inconsistent with one another. Slote believes all can be put forward as There are many ways to defend normative sentimentalism without relying on conceptual sentimentalism. First, normative sentimentalists may simply determine that the sort of moral judgments that most of us make most of the time are pretty much fine as they are. Such sentimentalists embrace a single rather than a dual process model, claiming that all of us make moral judgments more or less the same way, and that no better alternatives are available. One might take this a step further, and claim that when these everyday moral judgments come into conflict with one another-as they undeniably do with remarkable frequency-we should not conclude that one is morally right and the other is morally wrong. All moral sentiments are morally fine for those who feel them; one moral opinion is as morally good as any other.
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This universal approval of everyone's moral sentiments is the normative position which I think is most deserving of the label "moral relativism," although the term has also been used to identify a number of other normative views, as well as a variety of theories in conceptual metaethics. 16 As with normative sentimentalism, normative relativism can be defended either via appeal to or independent of its conceptual variant. 17 There are, however, legitimate doubts about the validity of this argument, as well as all other arguments from conceptual to normative relativism. It is certainly possible that there is a disanalogy here between the relationship between conceptual and normative sentimentalism on the one hand, and conceptual and normative relativism on the other. While conceptual sentimentalism implies normative sentimentalism, conceptual relativism may or may not imply normative relativism-and there is no need to determine whether or not it does for purposes of this essay. 18 This sentimentalist account of how we can improve our moral reflection is one of the main subjects addressed in my book The Enlightenment of Sympathy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. It was As Prinz makes clear, the two main moral sentiments are those of moral approval and disapproval. As he also observes, these sentiments can be self-as well as other-directed. Inherent in feeling a sentiment of self-disapproval is a sense that we are not doing what we ought to be doing, that we can do better. What Prinz fails to mention explicitly is that among the behaviors which can be subject to both self-and other-disapproval are our feelings of approval and disapproval themselves. But I do think this is the best way to make sense of the case he describes of the recovering homophobe, in which "a bigoted automatic appraisal" that homosexuality is wrong is "outweighed by a considered appeal" that it is not, and in which the agent "identifies with the latter conviction" (p. XX). In other words, the recovering homophobe disapproves of his own disapproval of homosexuality, but has only partially completed the process of purging this wayward moral sentiment from his psyche.
Every moral sentiment we feel is a possible candidate for such disapproval, including the higher-order sentiments which approve or disapprove of our lower-order ones. This raises the
possibility of an open-ended process of moral self-scrutiny, in which our moral sentiments are continually turned against themselves. 19 Although we can never reach a point when we possess certain, objective moral truths, we can reach a reflective equilibrium in which we can affirm that all our moral sentiments have been thoroughly tested. Such a progress of sentiments genuinely replaces moral opinion with a kind of moral knowledge. Yet as George Marcus observes in his contribution to this volume, "knowledge takes many forms" (p. XX). The sort of sentimentalist moral knowledge I want to defend is provisional rather than certain, and directed inward into the contingent makeup of the human psyche rather than outward into a non-contingent realm of moral reality-a realm of Platonic forms or necessary moral laws or what have you.
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The sentimentalist reflective process described by Hume and Smith also involves a protoKantian move from heteronomy to autonomy. Only through such a progress of sentiments can we take control of our moral lives. We consciously identify only with those moral sentiments which we can still endorse even after the greatest degree of critical self-reflection. What makes this view sentimentalist, however, is that these autonomous moral judgments contain emotion as surely as do heteronomous judgments.
But the relevant progress of sentiments is not merely a matter of individual reflection, of self-directed approval and disapproval. It is also a matter of interpersonal evaluation. of our own. To be sure, there is nothing in sentimentalism which precludes relativists from approving of moral judgments at odds with their own. But most of us do not share their sentiments. Most of us are inclined to disapprove of judgments which we do not share. Will this disapproval survive the process of reflective self-correction that I just described? To some degree, I think it probably will. But it will not emerge at the end of the reflective process unchallenged or unchanged.
The primary challenge to our disapproval of others' moral sentiments will come from sympathy or empathy. 23 Prinz departs from his Enlightenment-era forbearers quite strikingly by rejecting their contention that sympathy is central to the psychological etiology of all our moral sentiments. We can bracket this general claim for purposes of this essay, however. Whatever role sympathy may play with regard to our moral sentiments generally, it certainly can play a role in helping improve our judgments of the moral sentiments of others, particularly those from cultural traditions in which moral sentiments very different from our own predominate.
It is not that encountering alien moral views will necessarily lead us to empathize with those who advocate them. Far from it; fear and hatred are more common accompaniments to our disapproval of others' moral judgments. If those holding alien worldviews are kept far from us, and do not affect our ability to live according to our own sentiments, these negative emotions will likely mellow into cold indifference. None of these attitudes are conducive to sympathy or empathy. But if we must interact on a daily basis with those of whom we disapprove-if we 23 For purposes of this essay, I can avoid the question of what difference, if any there is between sympathy and empathy, in part since only the former was available to the eighteenth-century authors who initiated sentimentalism. But do see, among others on the topic, Stephen Darwall, "Empathy, Sympathy, Care," Philosophical Studies. 89 (1998), pp. 261-282. must build a common political life together-then there will be a desperate need for some way of accommodating each other.
Here, Herder is a much better eighteenth-century inspiration than Hume or Smith. 24 It was Herder who began the sort of inquiry into the origins of human moral sentiments which Nietzsche would later call genealogy. But while Nietzsche sought to debunk our moral commitments by revealing their ignoble origins, Herder sought to affirm most of the diverse moral sentiments he discovered across human cultures. The key, he argued, is to feel your way into the position of those whose histories and cultures, and hence whose judgments, are different from your own. Herder urges his readers to "go into the age, the clime, the whole history. Feel yourself into everything; only now are you on the way toward understanding…"
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The task is not easy; we must overcome the natural biases of our sympathy, which tend to be strongest for those closest to and most like us, and weakest for those who are different or distant or both. Difficult, yes, but not impossible; Herder maintained that our natural wonder and curiosity at the range of human diversity would be sufficient to motivate the hard emotional work required. Add to this humanistic impetus the practical goal of finding a mode of mutual accommodation in a culturally (and hence also morally) diverse society-a practical goal which
Herder did not consider adequately, largely because he was an adamant advocate of culturally uniform nation-states-and there is good reason to believe that many of us will at least attempt to empathize with our fellow citizens when we find ourselves in moral disagreement with them. 24 For a fuller defense of the interpretation of Herder presented in the following paragraphs see Through this imaginative and emotional investigation, you may come to understand that sentiments which once seemed to be strange and unnatural actually speak to human needs and feelings analogous to your own. This, in turn, may change your disapproval into approval.
Herder's empathy may therefore look like another path to normative moral relativism. Indeed, many have interpreted Herder in precisely that way. 26 But to understand all is not to approve of all. What is more, disapproval which remains once empathetic understanding is achieved seems likely to pass the test of sentimental reflection. The result is not relativism but value pluralism;
there is a range of incompatible human values which can all be approved of, but there are also others which cannot be. This, at least, was the lesson Isaiah Berlin took from Herder.
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But there is another possibility still. Someone who arrives at value pluralism via a sentimentalist path-as opposed to someone who is convinced that the plurality of values is rationally demonstrable-realizes that, like all moral knowledge, this pluralism can only be known provisionally. There is always the possibility that with greater sentimental reflection on the part of all parties concerned all of humanity will gradually converge on a single set of universal moral sentiments. This may seem improbable when it comes to standards of personal virtue, but there is a reasonable hope that it may be achieved when it comes to political justice.
While Herder approved of many cultural differences, he also approved of a universal sentiment of justice based on our shared humanity and our love of reciprocity. We will never be able to resolve all our moral disagreements on the basis of a single faculty of reason which all human beings share. But we may be able to resolve many, if perhaps not all, of our moral disagreements on the basis of other features we all share-most notably our susceptibility to emotions from physical pain to parental love, and our ability to understand and share the emotions of others. It is this, Herderian vision of sentimental consensus-building which I, for one, would like to see advanced in our moral, political and legal practices. But the ethics and politics of empathetic universalism are not implied by sentimentalism itself, anymore than the ethics and politics of relativism are so implied.
The fact that sentimentalism can consistently be used to defend such different worldviews should come as no surprise. After all, if sentimentalism is true, the ethical and political convictions of rival sentimentalists contain emotions as surely as do all other moral judgments.
The differences among their views therefore may not be resolvable through purely rational means. When we speak of the implications of sentimentalism, we are seeking exactly such a rational resolution-a logical deduction, from the shared premise of sentimentalism, which will demonstrate why one sentimentalist view is consistent and the other is inconsistent. A more promising approach would be to resolve disputes between sentimentalists in a sentimentalist greater reflective scrutiny of our own disapproval of their views. In adopting this approach, however, we must give up the idea that our interlocutors somehow failed to notice the direct normative implications of the premises we have in common. Nothing could be farther from the spirit of sentimentalism than dismissing moral worldviews with which we disagree as necessarily incoherent, let alone condemning those who embrace them as necessarily irrational.
Perhaps this is part of the reason why the debate among the original sentimentalists of the Enlightenment era was such a marvelous model of philosophical civility. Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, Herder and others at the time were united in their conviction that moral judgments contain emotions, but divided on most other moral and political questionsfrom the proper place of religion in public life to the viability of democracy to the alleged superiority of European over so-called "primitive" peoples. But Smith's disagreements with Hume, or Herder's disagreements with them both, did nothing to lessen their admiration for each other.
Smith was therefore wrong to deny the practical importance of moral psychology. To be sure, sentimentalism has no distinctive position on the question of moral relativism versus moral universalism, let alone on more specific issues like the proper level of progressivity in our tax system or the proper balance between the claims of individual liberty and those of collective security. But, in its normative form, sentimentalism can offer a distinctive position on how we ought to reflect individually, and deliberate collectively, on these and all other such difficult moral questions. Sentimentalism need not unleash hateful, unreflective emotions in our public discourse-or even relativist, tolerant indifference. A widespread embrace of specifically Herderian sentimentalism could instead lead to a cultivation of wide-ranging public empathy, and might help in the often seemingly fruitless task of rendering our civil life more worthy of the name "civil."
Pointing out the practical importance of sentimentalism does not detract from its importance for what Smith calls "speculation." Sentimentalism may also have profound importance for scholars, for philosophy understood in the eighteenth-century sense to include not only the normative and conceptual work which is today the responsibility of philosophers and political theorists, but also the empirical and interpretive scholarship which is now undertaken under the rubrics of the sciences and humanities.
The humanities in particular must not be neglected as a potential resource for enriching sentimentalist thought. Rightly dissatisfied with the arid conceptual analysis which came to dominate philosophy in the twentieth century, philosophers today have sought to bring their work in closer contact with empirical reality. Yet, for too many of them, the turn to reality has taken a detour through the experimental neuropsychology lab. Many recent empirical sentimentalists have believed this scientific approach to be in keeping with the spirit of Hume, who famously introduced his Treatise as "an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects." 30 Yet rather than using the term "experiment" to describe the observation of the operations of the social world around us and the psychological forces within us. For Hume, who was most famous in his own time as a historian and an essayist, these observations were not to be conducted in the laboratory under controlled conditions, but in the uncontrolled reality of human life, a reality that can only be captured in history and literature.
Although controlled experimentation will always be invaluable in moral psychology-as it is in so many other fields-there is no reason to privilege it over humanistic inquiry when investigating the nature of human sentiments.
Although (at least in my preferred version) sentimentalism is already a normative theory, the need for a humanistic version of sentimentalism is especially great when we turn from general normative conclusions about the proper place of emotion in moral judgment to specific ethical or political issues. Since sentimentalism implies that our disagreements on these issues may not always be resolvable by rational means alone, it might be taken to imply that rational scholarship has little or nothing to contribute to the resolution of these disputes. Alternately, however, a sentimentalist can consistently maintain that scholars can and should continue to write on particular normative questions. To do so effectively, however, they must not be afraid of employing modes of thought other than pure reasoning. Here, too, Herder can serve as a model:
His condemnation of European imperialism and insistence on cultural diversity is not the product of mere logical argument, but rests on an understanding of human difference built from his extensive studies of comparative literature, world history, comparative religion and all the other fields of humanistic scholarship-fields which require imaginative insight and emotional sensitivity as much as they require sound reasoning and solid empirical evidence. 32 As we 32 Herder's utilization and defense of the humanities has important parallels with that put forward more recently by Martha Nussbaum. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997 and Nussbaum, Not for better-and into an age in which experimental science stands alongside a priori argumentation as a means of attaining philosophical insight, Herder reminds us that a third, emotionally-laden mode of philosophizing is available, and is capable of establishing the truth of substantive ethical and political conclusions. In many cases, it may be the only effective means of doing so.
An appreciation that moral philosophy and political theory are emotional as well as intellectual work could potentially lead to profound changes in the practice of these disciplines.
The full revolutionary potential of sentimentalism will be apparent, however, only when we realize that the importance of a moral theory can have no correlation whatsoever with the importance of its substantive moral implications. Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities. Princeton, NJ: Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
